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The Missing Share 
The ritual language of sharing as a ‘total social fact’ in the eastern Himalayas 
(Northwest Yunnan, China) 
Stéphane Gros 
 
Northwest Yunnan is where the eastern flank of the Himalayas, in a spectacular 
bend, turns abruptly south. This is the heart of what is called the Hengduan Mountains, 
where the main rivers of Asia flow southward in parallel gorges separated by high altitude 
mountain ranges. Here, the administrative boundaries of the Tibetan Autonomous Region, 
the provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan, and the country of Burma (Myanmar) meet. It is the 
home of Tibetans, but also of several Tibeto-Burman speaking peoples, such as the Naxi,1 
the Lisu, 2  the Nung and the Drung, amongst a few others. 3  From the mid-nineteenth 
century until the mid-twentieth century, only a few explorers, geographers, botanists and 
scholars had crossed these mountains.4 Despite the increasing amount of research done 
during the last decade, we still know very little of Northwest Yunnan’s history and 
ethnology, especially of its more remote parts, such as the upper reaches of the Salween 
river (Nujiang) and the easternmost source of the Irrawaddy, where the Drung people live.5 
Historically, the northwestern borders of Yunnan province lay at the juncture of 
both Chinese and Tibetan expansion. This remote area was coveted by Tibetans, Naxi and 
Chinese, and has been a theatre of unceasing conflicts. For a long time, several political 
legitimacies coexisted, with the empowered parties exercising quite freely their rights on 
this territory. To this configuration was then added the progressive influence of the Qing 
dynasty, and later on that of the Republicans with their respective colonial policies. 
Nevertheless, until the first half of the twentieth century, this patch of land between Tibet, 
                                                 
1 For recent studies on Naxi (and Moso) see for example Oppitz and Hsu (eds), 1998; Mathieu, 2003. 
2 For the Lisu people of the upper Salween river valley, see the long introduction in Dessaint and Ngwâma, 
1994.  
3 Nu and Dulong are respectively the standardized form (and official name in Chinese) of the names of these 
two groups. The Drung are part of a linguistic group together with the Nung and the Rawang of Burma. 
About the relationships between these groups, see Gros, 2004. 
4 The French missionaries of the Foreign Missions Society of Paris were among the first westerners to 
discover this part of the Sino-Tibetan borders, and because of their long term relationships with the local 
populations, they also were able to provide detailed information about many aspects of this area, including its 
geographical, cultural and political particularities. See Gros, 1996, 2001. 
5 The anthropological research I undertook about the Drung (Dulong) people, and the several fieldwork 
assignments I conducted between 1998 and 2003 for a total of eighteen months, was largely funded by a 
Franco-Chinese Bilateral Grant (1997–1998), a Lavoisier Grant of the French Foreign Affairs (1999), the 
financial support of the France Fundation (1999), and that of the Louis Dumont’s Fund for Social 
Anthropology (2003). 
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China and Burma was like a free zone, where only local chieftains retained any real 
authority.  
As with some other Tibeto-Burman speaking people still presently living in the 
area, the Drung, long known under the Chinese name of Qiuzi (Kiutzu), were caught 
between their more powerful neighbours despite the isolation of their mountainous valley. 
While very little was known about these people, their valley soon became a pawn in 
imperial rivalries. As the British botanist, F. Kingdon Ward once wrote:  
“It is certainly curious that no less than three empires should have laid claim to this 
wild valley. China has claimed it on the rather shabby plea that she was the first to 
oppress the Kiutzu [Qiuzi]—taxation without compensation is a sheer oppression. 
Tibet claimed it on the ground that she had long been accustomed to extract slaves 
from that region. Britain’s claim rests, in part, on the perfectly absurd ground that 
the inhabitants want her to take it over”. (1924: 190) 
Since the end of the nineteenth century up the the 1930s, this area was considered 
an “un-delimited frontier.” China and Britain were not the only two rivals. Local rulers, 
Tibetans but also Naxi, added to the complex layering of spheres of power over this area. 
There, interethnic relationships were framed by power relations between these neighbours, 
a configuration in which the Drung people could only occupy the lower end of the political 
hierarchy. Though not reported with much detail in historical documents, some Drung 
women and men were indeed at times taken away, or exchanged for oxen as we will see, to 
become slaves in an alien land. I will here argue that such facts can better be understood in 
this context by taking into consideration the whole system of goods exchange and political 
relationships, which reveals not only a social hierarchy, but also cultural values that are 
important for our understanding of the socio-political specificities of this area. 
In Northwest Yunnan and its adjacent regions (upper Burma, eastern Tibet), I 
believe there is something like a “ritual language” that is common to these otherwise 
dissimilar groups. It seems that the way locals, whether Tibetan, Naxi or less politically 
centralised groups such as the Drung, understood the workings of political action was 
intimately linked with that of ritual action. This echoes Leach’s view of highland Burma 
and refers to his oft-cited formulation that “people may speak different languages, wear 
different kinds of clothes, live in different kinds of houses, but they understand each 
other’s ritual. Ritual acts are ways of ‘saying things’ about social status, and the ‘language’ 
in which these things are said is common to the whole Kachin area” (1997 [1954]: 279).  
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From this point of view, I will reflect upon political relations between the local 
populations and try to shed some light on their underlying principle. In this chapter, I will 
analyse the workings of political relationships and exchange networks in a regional system 
involving the circulation of both goods and people, but also values regarding wealth and 
status differences. Using an ethno-historical approach, I will show how exchange, 
partaking and debt are for the local societies of this very specific area, where China, Tibet 
and Burma meet, key notions that articulate a more general politico-religious system. I will 
do so by combining ethnographic data collected mainly among the Drung with 
historiographical sources in western and Chinese languages. My aim is twofold. On the 
one hand, I would like to try to characterize the notion of ritual language used by Leach in 
his book Political Systems and discuss its heuristic value. By so doing, I hope to contribute 
to a clarification of the notion so that we can better appreciate its place in Leach’s work. It 
is my conviction that it lies at the very heart of his anthropology. On the other hand, 
presenting my own analysis based on an ethno-historical approach to the relationships 
between the Drung and their neighbours on the Sino-Burmese border, I would like to make 
use of this notion of ritual language in an attempt to elaborate it further.  
 
The notion of “ritual language” 
Ritual was an important focus of Leach’s later anthropological work, but, before 
this, a good deal of his approach in Political Systems depended upon his understanding of 
ritual. In fact, Leach did not attempt to define ritual but to reconcile divergent views in an 
approach to ritual broadly conceived as a system of symbolic communication. I will here 
recapitulate the essential aspects of Leach’s “unorthodox” treatment of ritual - as he 
labelled it himself in the introductory note of the 1964 reprint of the book - and underline 
what makes the basic characteristics of his notion of ritual language.6 
For the members of a group, the meaning of their actions is expressed in what 
Leach calls “ritual,” giving to this notion an extended meaning. Ritual, Leach stated, 
“serves to express the individual’s status as a social person in the structural system in 
which he finds himself for the time being” (1997 [1954]: 10-11). It could be said that ritual 
is the home-made model which refers directly to the more abstract order of reality. Leach 
                                                 
6 It should be clear here that my aim is not to elaborate on the concept of ritual in anthropological thinking in 
general, but to frame the present discussion within Leach’s own definition. It is equally important to 
understand that Leach’s use of the notion of “ritual language” covers a broader range of social actions than 
what is generally implied by the ritual use of language, or religious language. This later and more exclusive 
acceptation of the notion (see for example Sadan, this volume) should not be confused with the meaning it 
takes in the present case. 
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views ritual in its cultural context as “a pattern of symbols” that “makes explicit the social 
structure” (ibid.: 15). The structure that is symbolised in ritual is “the system of socially 
approved ‘proper’ relations between individuals and groups. These relations are not 
formally recognised at all times [… and] this neglect of formal structure is essential if 
ordinary informal social activities are to be pursued at all” (ibid.: 15-16). “My thesis,” 
wrote Leach, “is that in ritual action and in myth the actor is ‘making statements’ 
concerning the same abstract order of reality as that with which the anthropologist is 
concerned when he uses technical jargon to describe some feature of social structure” 
(ibid.: 86).  
As the French anthropologist Jean Pouillon noted in his afterword to the French 
edition of Political Systems [1972], according to Leach, structure is a matter of concepts, 
not facts. And between the facts and the model elaborated by the ethnologist lies what we 
can call the “indigenous model.” This model reflects the underlying order that is supposed 
to guide people’s social activities: “Ritual performances have this function [of reminding 
about this underlying order] for the participating group as a whole; they momentarily make 
explicit what is otherwise a fiction” (Leach 1997 [1954]: 16). In other words, “ritual” as an 
aspect of culturally defined behaviour is attributed by Leach the qualities of a language, 
and such “verbal categories” as ritual actions and myth refer to an as if system of ideas, a 
“structure.” 
The example of the Hpalang community that Leach studied in detail can help in 
presenting Leach’s approach in more concrete terms. This community comprised several 
ethnicities, such as Jinghpaw, Atsi, Maru, Lisu and Chinese. Each of these groups—
approached by Leach as “sectors” within the social structure—had its own language, 
religious practices and customary behaviour. But in Leach’s discussion of the principles of 
Kachin social structure common to all of them, such differences can only be understood as 
internal variations. 
“Since the members of the Hpalang community were all part of one political 
system, they had to be able to communicate with one another about political status, 
and they did so in the language of ritual action. Precisely because Kachin society as 
a whole is made up of numerous sub-groups speaking diverse spoken languages we 
may expect that at a ritual level there is a rather simple stereotyped ritual ‘language’ 
which is understood by all sub-groups and in which issues of status are constantly 
represented in much the same way. Kachin ritual expression is relatively simple 
precisely because Kachin culture is complex.” (ibid.: 102) 
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Being part of a same political system, people communicate about their social 
identity (status) through ritual means. There are therefore two associated aspects which 
deserve further discussion: that of communication and that of identity. 
 
Ritual and communication  
In Leach’s view, ritual was not limited to its religious (or transcendental) aspects. 
He clearly expressed his rebuttal of the classic Durkheimian dichotomy between “sacred” 
and “profane”: 
“… [T]echnique and ritual, profane and sacred, do not denote types of action but 
aspects of almost any kind of action. Technique has economic material 
consequences which are measurable and predictable; ritual on the other hand is a 
symbolic statement which ‘says’ something about the individuals involved in the 
action.” (ibid.: 13) 
Ritual is therefore a category that encompasses different types of activities, and 
schematically all types of action can have a ritual aspect. It can be true of the way people 
dress, speak (and the language in which they choose to speak), etc. But myth and ritual (in 
the restricted sense of ritual performances) are the two main types of action that are of 
primary importance: 
“Myth, in my terminology, is the counterpart of ritual; myth implies ritual, ritual 
implies myth, they are one and the same. […] As I see it, myth regarded as a 
statement in words ‘says’ the same thing as ritual regarded as a statement in 
action.” (ibid.: 13) “…[R]itual action and belief are alike to be understood as forms 
of symbolic statement about the social order.” (ibid.: 14) “… [M]yth and ritual are 
one and the same. Both are modes of making statements about structural 
relationships” (ibid.: 264). 
Leach’s approach is limited to myth as something that reflects patterns of social 
relations. Ultimately, the only thing “rituals” have in common is that they are actions that 
communicate meanings, or, in some cases could create the very meanings they 
communicate. Therefore, it appears in all these formulations, that the roots for Leach’s 
later exploration of the concept of ritual (1968, 1971 [1966], 1976) were already there as 
the theoretical background of his Political Systems. Ritual, as he understood it, was 
basically a “symbolic communicative performance;” myths were a matter of verbal 
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communication, whereas ritual performances were a matter of symbolic communication.7 
He proposes that we look for similarities in patterns of communication rather than try to 
arrive at universally valid definitions of ritual. 
 
Ritual, identity and ambiguity 
Leach’s main goal was to offer an analysis of the Kachin system, and his 
formulation of the use of ritual to express status is embedded in the context of empirical 
political behaviour. However, ritual also appears as a means to deal with specific systems 
of relationships and to express an individual’s identity in the system. This is why, for 
example, everyday actions fall into the “ritual” sphere that Leach had in mind, and 
language change expresses the social positioning of actors: 
“The two sides of this paradox [in some cases Kachins seem conservative about 
language but others seem almost willing to change their language as a man might 
change a suit of clothes] both exemplify the same social fact, namely that, in my 
terminology, for a man to speak one language rather then another is a ritual act, it is 
a statement about one’s personal status; to speak the same language as one’s 
neighbours expresses solidarity with those neighbours, to speak a different 
language from one’s neighbours expresses social distance or even hostility.” (ibid.: 
49) 
In Leach’s work, ritual appears as a means of expression in a more general politics 
of identity. This politics of identity encompasses specific claims of status position in the 
socio-political hierarchy; ritual elements can be integrated into both religious and secular 
settings that affect the identity of participants.  
When Leach demonstrates the process by which Kachins have become Shans and 
Shans have become Kachins, he proceeds to show that this has been possible because 
Shans and Kachins share a common language of ritual expression, and can thus be thought 
of as members of “one society.” One could say that there is a ritual language of ethnic 
relations: in multi-ethnic societies, some “lingua franca” is needed to designate status 
positions between groups and individuals. This is a prerequisite for the contextual 
                                                 
7 The general discussion on the implications and limitations of such an approach goes far beyond the scope 
of this paper. Leach’s understanding of ritual action has been discussed in a stimulating way by Tambiah 
(2002: 350-356), pointing out his two complementary perspectives, i.e. special behaviour in ritual occasions 
and behaviour in everyday life (presentation of self).  
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definition of ethnic identities and Leach’s discussion of the fluidity of identities is one of 
his important and well-known contributions to theories of ethnicity.8 
Another important aspect underpinning part of Leach’s interpretation of the 
dynamic of the system is the ambiguity of the ritual language. 
“Myth and ritual is a language of signs in terms of which claims to rights and status 
are expressed, but it is a language of argument, not a chorus of harmony. If ritual is 
sometimes a mechanism of integration, one could as well argue that it is often a 
mechanism of disintegration.” (ibid.: 278) 
“There are, as we have seen, a large number of ‘ritual acts’ which can be said to 
have the same meaning whether the actor is a Shan, a gumsa Kachin or a gumlao 
Kachin, but the inferences that are to be drawn from such acts will be entirely 
different in each case. That such ambiguity does not lead to intolerable 
misunderstandings is due to the essential vagueness of all ritual statements. Ritual 
and mythology ‘represent’ an ideal version of social structure. It is a model of how 
people suppose their society to be organised, but it is not necessarily the goal 
towards which they strive.” (ibid.: 286) 
As a “language of argument,” the “ritual language” allows manipulation by 
protagonists. Its potential ambiguity is essential to the social dynamic that Leach aimed at 
describing. In his approach to myth and ritual, Leach rejected the functionalist view of a 
coherent whole composed of one mutually consistent set of myths that served as a charter 
for ritual action. Myth and ritual are both ways in which Kachin and Shan represent to 
themselves their social structure in its changing nature and with its contradictions. 
For Leach, there is no significant difference between so-called magical rites and 
expressive political or technological action. Ritual is no more than a symbolic expression 
of status and is analysed in terms of the logic of linguistics. As he later on wrote in Culture 
and Communication (1976), we engage in rituals in order to transmit collective messages 
to ourselves, and these messages, Leach asserted, are always about the social order. For 
Leach, as he further developed in this book, ritual is a medium for the expression of 
cultural ideals and models that, in turn, serves to orient other forms of social behavior. 
But, on what grounds can one argue that there is one system of ritual expression? 
And if this language is common and “‘represents’ an ideal version of social structure,” as 
                                                 
8 See Corlin (1994) who suggests that the “ritual language” of ethnic relations is patterned after a general 
conceptual model regarding the universe and man’s place in the world. The all-pervading and integrative 
marriage system also contributes to the blurriness of ethnic categories; see Robinne, this volume.  
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Leach has it, what is this common structure? Or, to put it another way, what is the model, 
the underlying common order? Ritual theory has evolved since the publication of Leach’s 
Political Systems, and there has been criticism of the tendency to analyse ritual as a 
language as well as criticism of the attempt to analyse ritual as being communicative. After 
all, Leach himself pointed out that ritual is a category scholars have invented, and in large 
measure, theories of ritual depend upon the phenomena to which one chooses to assign the 
ritual label. But I shall now address these questions through an analysis of the social and 
political situation of the borderlands of northwest Yunnan, with special reference to the 
first half of the twentieth century. My intent here is to follow on from Leach’s intuition 
about the existence of a common ritual language and approach the interactions between the 
Drung people and their neighbours in much the same fashion. I propose to study the way in 
which the Drung were integrated into the multi-ethnic environment of the eastern 
Himalayas, and how, through their interactions with their neighbours, they produced as 
well as were ascribed their differences. In this context, the debt seems to be an essential 
matrix of the construction and the expression of the political relationship between the 
groups, and it contributed to establish or abolish the frontiers between them. In this sense, 
the logic of debt and its ritual, political, and economical expressions constitutes a common 
language that enables all the groups to produce their differences, and which, in the process, 
also includes them in a common social system. 
 
Debt and hierarchy 
In Leach’s manner, my perspective here is to consider the Drung in terms of their 
relations with their neighbours, not as an isolated social entity. Considering their 
geographical location and their socio-cultural characteristics, they could potentially be 
considered part of the Kachin world, in the sense Leach used that category. The Drung 
(Dulong) people are a Tibeto-Burman speaking group officially recognized as one of the 
fifty-five “minority nationalities” (shaoshu minzu) of the People’s Republic of China. They 
are relatively isolated in the small valley through which the easternmost source of the 
Irrawaddy meanders, today an administrative division of the Dulong and Nu Nationalities 
Autonomous County of Gongshan (map 1). 9 As they were officially recognized as the 
separate “Dulong minzu,” they were by this process distinguished from the Nung (Nu 
                                                 
9 The total Drung (Dulong) population in China is estimated as 7,426 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 
2002: 97), making up one of the smallest official minority nationalities in China. More than 5000 Drung live 
in the remote Dulong valley bordering Burma. 
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minzu) to the east, and from the Rawang that were on the other side of the national border. 
But, even up to the present, Drung have familial, cultural and linguistic links with these 
close neighbours that transcend natural and political barriers (see Gros, 2004). 
However, their inclusion into the Kachin social system is not a given. For most of 
their history, their relationships with political powers have been oriented to the East, with 
both Tibetan chieftains and the Chinese empire, first indirectly through the office of tusi 
(indigenous chief) granted to the Naxi rulers, and later on by means of direct 
administration. For the Drung people, power and authority have always been linked to the 
east, since mythical times, and they nowadays often refer to this configuration as the time 
of the “Chiefs of the East.”  
It is these political relations with Tibetans, Naxi and Chinese that I am taking into 
consideration in the following analysis of the Drung people’s place in a regional system. 
The political situation of this area bordering Tibet and Burma was, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, under the authority of a Naxi indigenous chief (tusi), who was at this time himself 
under the higher authority of a Chinese official. To the north, Tibetans of Tsarong also 
extended their political influence, and at some point, the Naxi chief gave away to the 
Tibetans, nominally at least, his right to receive taxes from the Drung and the Nung. 
Therefore, for the population of the upper Salween valley and of the Drung valley, this 
resulted in overlapping spheres of authority. Nung as well as Drung were at the meeting 
point of the colonial expansion of their more powerful neighbours, whom they would 
sometimes resist by making ephemeral alliances with each other. More often, debt or even 
confiscation of land would cause the families to move away. In this area, the Drung and the 
Nung occupied the lower end of the political hierarchy. 
An historically informed study of this area enables us to discover some aspects of 
the processes of political integration. Yunnan’s borderlands had been the object of rivalry 
between Naxi, Tibetans and Chinese, so that the interests of several political authorities 
were simultaneously focused there. At the same time, the principal actors profited 
handsomely from the development of large-scale commercial activities (cf. Gros 1996). 
Debt appears to have been an institutional means for gaining political ascendancy and 
control over land and it allowed the layering of various spheres of power.  
By the very means of debt relations there was a possibility of land appropriation 
and the debt system, therefore, played a role in land distribution. In numerous villages in 
the upper reaches of the Salween, the Nung people had several creditors to whom they had 
to cede their land while remaining on the land as tenant farmers. As guarantee for rising 
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debts, rights over land were ultimately transferred. Land could pass through different hands 
and debt was one of the expressions of this mobility, implying changes in social relations. 
The creditor, having obtained the economic dependency of part of the population, was 
potentially a chief. Loans with interest were granted to locals by Naxi tusi, Buddhist 
temples, and some Tibetan chiefs as well. Commercial activities, like the selling of salt, 
several kinds of metal tools, cloth and wool, were also in their hands.  
The enslaved and the indebted represented two different degrees in a relationship of 
dependence. The relationship between the debtor and his creditor gave rise to a stable 
relationship of political dependency. This was the basis for a stratification of power and 
social organisation, thus revealing the strong link between political and economic 
relationships. In other words, the initial relationship based on exchange was transformed 
into an asymmetrical relationship, characteristic of dependency. As such, the creditor-
debtor relationship becomes a central paradigm for understanding the grounding of 
relationships of dependence. 10 Tibetan and indigenous chiefs (tusi) exploited this very 
same process. Indeed, in this remote area up to the first half of the twentieth century, 
impoverished peasants could not escape from the debt system. This was especially the case 
for the less powerful Drung and Nung who became potential slaves. However, it is 
important to specify to what extent, and in which cases, it might be possible to speak of 
slavery, for it seems that diverse modes of servitude coexisted. 
There were cases of external slavery: abduction, raids, all of which had as a target 
others, people external to the community of reference. Yet, there were also forms of 
internal slavery, in particular for debt. Debt slavery was described by missionaries and 
travelers in this part of the Sino-Tibetan finges as an issue that concerned a great part of 
the population. It was present in eastern Tibet (Tsarong, Dzayul) as well as in the 
Tibetanized part of northwest Yunnan.11 Debt was closely associated with service labor 
and, in its extreme form, slavery. 
One of the missionaries who resided for many years at the border of southeastern 
Tibet specified that, amongst approximately six thousand families one could find in 
Tsarong at that time: “270 only are tributary [i.e. “taxes payers”, khral-pa]; the others are 
farmers for the lamaseries [monasteries] or slaves of some rich owner” (Goré, 1923: 377). 
The farmers who did not have any means of paying their debts could become the slaves of 
                                                 
10 See Galey (1980: 145) on the creditor-debtor paradigm. For further details, see Gros 1996, 2001, 2005: 
chap. 3 and 4. 
11 See Goré, 1923: 388-390; Ward, 1934: 52.  
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their creditor or settle their debt by giving one of their children. Those enslaved for debt 
could, in theory, free themselves; but rare were those who had the means to pay for their 
freedom. The creditor could transfer the debt to a purchaser, and the debtor thus changed 
creditor and his status was transmitted to his descendants. In these Tibetan areas, many 
slaves were Drung or originated from the regions at the edges of the Himalayas (Upper 
Burma, Arunachal, Assam), but the debt phenomenon concerned the population as a 
whole, Tibetan or not.12 
As mentioned previously, it also happened that Drung people were captured when 
victims of raids. However, some Drung also played an active part in a relatively important 
trade, geographically if not numerically, in which people were exchanged against goods, 
more often oxen. According to some oral accounts, the inhabitants of the south of the 
Drung valley took part in this trade more actively. 13  These accounts accord with 
information provided by Father Fage who mentioned that: “Dijoux14 […] are robbers, 
plunderers, and the trade of the slaves is almost entirely in their hands.” He continued by 
specifying that the Drung (and those who were at that time included in the same Qiuzi 
category) “like the ox flesh passionately, and would not renounce any sacrifice in order to 
get some. The Thibetans [sic] exploit this disproportionate craving and send to them each 
year hundreds of oxen; they receive in exchange the young slaves who receive our 
solicitude.”15 
There is probably a degree of exaggeration in the remarks of the missionary 
because, at a rate of hundreds of oxen per annum, not many Drung would have remained. 
                                                 
12 See Gros, 1996, 2001. One of the most precise descriptions of the situation in Tsarong is that provided by 
Rockhill (1881: 285-286), in which the ambiguity there can be between indebtedness and slavery and the 
possibility of a transformation from one to the other is rather clear: “… While speaking of the Tsarong it is 
proper to note that the slavery exists there in a more aggravated form than in any other portion of Tibet. 
While now and then a poor Tibetan pilgrim, on his way through the Tsarong to the Dokéla [Dokerla], or to 
some other famous sanctuary, may become indebted to some one for the amount of his board or the like, and 
be obliged to work out by four or five years of labor his little indebtedness, he at least eventually gains 
freedom; but such is not the case with most of the slaves in the Tsarong, who are taken from among the 
Lissus and other non-Tibetan tribes inhabiting the country. When one of these is in debt to a Tibetan and 
unable to meet the demands of his creditor, he becomes his “life servant” (ts’é yo [tshe-gyog]). The master 
has the right to sell, kill, or otherwise dispose of him; he is given a wife, or a share in a woman, and all the 
children born to him are slaves. Even if he should be able to get together enough to pay off his debt, the 
master may refuse it and count his labor as only a set-off for the interest of the sum due. The missionaries 
have bought and freed a number of these ts’é yo, but usually they have been able to buy only slave children; 
this class of person formed the nucleous of several of their little Christian communities.”  
13 Due to space limitation I cannot here all the details regarding this situation as it figures in Gros, 2005: 
chap. 4.  
14 The Father Fage is here using his own transcription of the name of a valley to the west of Dulongjiang in 
todays Burma. 
15 Letter to M. Legrégeois, Bonga (Thibet), July 23, 1857, Archives de la Société des Missions Étrangères de 
Paris, vol. 556 (2) [839].  
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Nevertheless, it should be recalled that not only Drung people were exchanged. The slave 
trade also targeted adults or children who originated from other areas to the west. The 
French missionaries partly constituted their small community by purchasing slaves. These 
communities, therefore, included children, (both boys and girls), generally non-Tibetans 
who were orphans, victims of abduction or who had been sold by their indebted parents.16 
According to missionaries as well as the accounts of travelers at the turn of the 
twentieth century, the locality of Menkong in Tsarong was a center of the slave trade. In a 
short note, J. H. Edgar wrote that “Menkong before 1911 was an important slave market 
where men and women were bought and sold openly,” and according to the French 
Tibetologist J. Bacot, fathers, mothers and children could be sold separately (1912: 273). 
Most of the slaves were non-Tibetans and were most probably from the Drung and related 
groups.17 
The living conditions of the slave and the rights that the master had over him could 
vary somewhat, but it is clear that slaves could be sold in Tsarong and its surroundings. 
The market extended beyond Tsarong, since we know that some Lisu took part in it, and 
that the Naxi indigenous chiefs (tusi) of the Mekong valley owned a number of Qiuzi 
slaves who were freed on the order of the Chinese authorities during first half of the 
eighteenth century. 
All together, the origin and status of the “slaves” varied from one place to another 
and included people living at the margins of society or who were in some ways excluded 
from it such as orphans, robbers, prisoners of war, people who had been captured or were 
in debt. Many testimonies indicate that their living and working conditions were not 
particularly difficult. However, the relative discomfort of work and the living conditions is 
not a sufficient criterion to identify or distinguish the status of the enslaved. To speak 
about slavery and slaves in the fullest sense of the term, it is necessary to admit the 
fundamental fact of exclusion. The status of the slave is marked by his total exclusion from 
a fundamental dimension of the society: that through which identity and status of member 
of the community is articulated. As Testart (2001: 24) wrote: “the slave is a man without 
identity.” 
Within Drung society, for example, this exclusion refers to kinship. For this reason, 
it is often specified by the Drung themselves that the exchanges for oxen often concerned 
                                                 
16 See Launay, 1902, I: 245. Archives de la Société des Missions Étrangères de Paris, vol. 556 A(2). Letter 
from M. Renou to Mgr de Sinopolis, Tcha-mou-tong, January 28, 1859 [1379].  
17 See also Bailey, 1912: 338; 1945: 89. 
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orphans, and more significantly—in this patrilineal society—children who did not have a 
recognized father. By extension, one can consider that for the Tibetans in Tsarong, this 
exclusion referred to the community of language and culture, as well as religious identity, 
so that the slaves originated from groups considered “ethnically” different and non-
Buddhist.18 Thus, a difference remained according to the origin of the person. In this area, 
between Tibetans themselves slavery was initially a system by which persons could be 
pawned (pledged) for debts, and the enslavement was thus only the result of a 
transformation of the status of the pawned person. In the long term, the pawned person was 
likely to become slave.19 
What is of importance is that the trafficking of the enslaved proceeded between 
groups which were distinct by their identity and status, and that the slaves were generally, 
it seems, children or teenagers. However, the sale alone did not make it possible to ensure 
that they would always be slaves: in the case of debts, it is possible that we are closer to the 
workings of a pawn system. But if there was a firm sale and the individual who was sold 
was cut from his family ties, it would indeed be slavery. However, should they be pawned 
for debts or slaves, they would likely fall into the networks of the slave trade. In Tsarong, it 
seems that pawned persons could be sold or transferred, like slaves. 
Therefore, if we consider documented cases, slavery is found together with other 
types of service labor that do not imply a radical exclusion from society. In the case of a 
person pawned for debt, or of voluntary dependence or abduction (which could, however, 
mean that the individual would actually be cut off from his familial ties), the bond with the 
community of origin is preserved, which implies the possibility of a return to that 
community. 
Similar facts are to be found on a regional scale, and a comparative study could be 
carried out from the borders of Yunnan to Assam. The great diversity found in status 
complicates such a task,20 but one can underline at least two significant characteristics 
regionally: the important role of external slavery (by capture or abduction), and the 
phenomenon of internal slavery, which corresponds to the possibility of selling a member 
of one’s community or, more precisely, to having rights over a person and being able to 
transfer these rights. 
                                                 
18 This point was highlighted by Lazcano Nebreda, 1998: 229-231. 
19 About the pawning of persons, see Testart, 2001: chap. 3. 
20 From a theoretical point of view, the discussion in Testart (2001: 115, 151-152) is to me the most rigorous. 
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The sale of slaves has also been documented among the populations of Upper 
Burma. For example, among the Taron(g), adultery was punished by the sale of the two 
guilty parties (Mya-Tu, 1966: 33). Further to the south among the Maru, the sale of people 
to the Kachin (Jinghpaw) seems to have been relatively frequent (Pritchard, 1914: 528). It 
is probable that, in the first case, the key issue was about selling into slavery, but the 
second case could relate more to sale for indebtedness, with, at least in theory, the 
possibility of releasing the pawned person from the enslaved state by repurchasing him/her 
later on. 21  Nevertheless, there can also be no intention of repurchase, so that the 
(voluntary) sale becomes, in fact, final. 
For the Kachin, the mayam, who according to Leach represented almost half of the 
population, were slaves; they were out of kinship bonds and could be sold [but see Maran, 
this volume].22 Leach had a different perspective and, according to him: “the majority were 
voluntary serfs - or even adoptive sons - of their Master, rather than movable goods” 
(Leach, 1968: 145, n. 2). The problem of voluntary dependence also exists in the case of 
the Drung. Some - without preliminary debts, without being sold - decided to put 
themselves at the service of a Tibetan chief.  
With regard to voluntary dependence in northwest Yunnan, many seem to have 
preferred the servile condition to freedom. “Slavery is all in all only a life time’s 
domesticity, without pledges, and many slaves, accustomed to this condition, prefer it to 
freedom” wrote Father Goré (1992 [1939]: 106). Outside of Tsarong, in the Tibetan 
communities of the Mekong valley, the slaves seemed better off. According to J. Bacot, 
serfdom would be a more correct term. He gives the example of a Tibetan who had seven 
wives and about fifty slaves (he himself did not know exactly how many), with whom he 
shared his harvest. “This appearance of richness does not require at all the possession of a 
single taël. […] No external difference distinguishes the Master from the slave. They wear 
the same clothes, eat together and are polite with each other” (1912: 273; emphasis added). 
To me, the ‘softness’ of the living conditions does not change anything with regard to 
status. Indeed, it is a matter of wealth, as the master is rich because of his dependents. The 
                                                 
21 See for example this case mentioned in Pritchard (1914: 530): “He was sixteen years old, and had been a 
slave in Kachin country for two years. His people had sold him originally for a coat and cooking-pots. He 
had nothing but good to say of his Kachin owners. […] Pritchard asked him why he did not run away from 
his Kachin masters, and he replied that, in the first place, he had no wish to do so, as he was very well 
treated; and, in the second, his own people who sold him had told him that they would sooner or later buy 
him back” (also quoted in Leach, 1979 [1954]: 303). In this case, the sale is not definitive and the pawned 
person is still a member of his kinship group.  
22 I follow Testart (2001: 151-152) on this point, based on the data provided in the Appendice III in Leach 
(1979 [1954]: see also 160-162); See also Nugent, 1982: 519. 
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fact that it could be, like Bacot put it, just an “appearance of richness” is significant. It 
follows that prestige is acquired thanks to the number of dependents or slaves.23 The slave, 
sharing the misfortunes as well as the good fortune of his master, also contributes to the 
master’s prestige.  
 
Ritual and power 
By emphasizing the complexity of political and commercial interactions and the 
dynamic relationship between these contiguous societies, one can point out some 
fundamental aspects of their relationships. The importance of trade and debt invites us to 
see in exchange a means, as limited as it is, of access to power. However, it is a power that 
goes well beyond the economic domain. 
By recognizing the value that Drung people granted to some goods that they had 
secured by trading with their neighbours, one restores the active role of these goods within 
the exchange system. For example, gongs, which came from Burma, iron utensils 
(machetes, pots and tripods in particular) were all items of prestige that Drung traded with 
their neighbours. Indeed, they formerly constituted the principal set of goods that, locally, 
could enter into the composition of some forms of compensation, in particular those made 
for matrimonial exchanges. Among these goods, the most prestigious were certainly the 
oxen. They were bought outside the Dulong valley because Drung people themselves did 
not raise them. Drung people and some of their neighbours needed oxen as a prestige good 
for matrimonial exchanges, as well as for communal sacrifices. 
Locally, among the Drung, there were sufficiently rich individuals who, for their 
own prestige, organized on their own behalf the sacrifices of oxen, and would divide the 
meat that would be partaken. Because Drung people carried out their own sacrificial rituals 
in their villages, they needed oxen, which they often got by exchanging those excluded by 
their society. The equivalence (or conversion) between ox and slave in the exchange, tends 
to show that the slave as well as the ox enter the category of the ritual goods that ensure the 
prestige of the owner. 
From the Drung people’s point of view, oxen were the main goal of the trade that 
sometimes involved the circulation of people, often children and women. The exchange of 
persons occupied the highest-value level of exchange. Furthermore, if “exchange” may be 
                                                 
23 About the Kachin, Leach (1968: 161) mentioned that chiefs gained their reputation by having many slaves, 
but there were many economic advantages to the servile condition. Contractual slavery was a means to obtain 
economic credit and political protection from the chief. 
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described by detailing what one person gives to another, there was a higher order of 
exchange, a larger set of relations that structured exchange itself. 
It is worth mentioning here how this structure of exchange and debt relationship 
was also used on another level by the Drung, by referring to their political allegiance to the 
Tibetan chieftains of Tsarong. Formerly, the Tibetans chieftains were considered by the 
Drung of the northern part of the Dulong valley as the “masters of the place” (mvli 
aqkang), and a tax was annually perceived as a compensation “to eat the land” (amra kai). 
This relationship of subordination was initiated in a particular way.  
The Drung tell the story that only those, in the north of the valley, who had received 
their share of the meat of nine oxen that the Tibetans had once killed, became subordinate 
and had to pay the tax. The meat had been divided in the form of skewers and had been 
distributed in all the north of the valley. It is told that in the south of the valley, the 
distribution did not take place because the six porters (Drung people originating from the 
south of the valley) died on the way. Thus, “the tax was cut” (kri tot) where they died, this 
place becoming a geographical limit: not having received a share of meat, the inhabitants 
of the south of the valley would not pay the tax. 
The distribution of the meat among the inhabitants of the Drung valley legitimised 
the political ascendancy of the Tibetans who were recognized as “masters of the land” by 
the Drung. One could expect the distribution of meat to be carried out by those who had a 
claim to power. But in that case, the status of the Tibetan chiefs seemed already acquired, 
and the distribution was but a legitimisation. According to Drung people’s accounts, the 
distribution of meat carried out by the Tibetans chiefs seems to have crystallised the 
hierarchy by confirming a relation of dependence. 
Interestingly, this very same process of meat distribution appears also in the 
relationship between the Naxi tusi (indigenous chiefs) and their dependents, the Lisu, Nung 
and Drung people of the Mekong and Salween valleys. Some historical records mention 
that this chief, one of the main authorities in northwest Yunnan up to the beginning of the 
twentieth century, organized feasts for his dependents. 24  Every year, all (the 
representatives of) his subjects were required to come and bring him a present for the New 
Year, and he was to entertain all of them for three days. Every three years, he also 
organized feasts during which he distributed a piece of beef.  
                                                 
24 There are historical documents that refer to the period of the seventeenth century, and later on to the period 
when the French missionaries were present (end of the nineteenth century). 
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These feasts seem to correspond to something other than a simple tributary 
relationship. What must be underlined in this case is that political centralisation was also a 
ritual process.25 Through these feasts, the status of the tusi and the political centralisation 
that he represented were confirmed and his prestige was enhanced. The extent of the 
festivals given by the Naxi indigenous chiefs seem to have been sufficiently significant for 
Roux to refer to them in the following terms: 
“In a few days [at the beginning of August 1895], more than one million of these 
natives [Lisu, Nu and Qiuzi] will come, like every year at the time of Ho-Pa-Tsié,26 
to bring to him, at a rate of approximately one taël per capita, their tribute in kind, 
in the form of wax, musk, powder of gold, medicinal plants, etc.  On the other 
hand, he will give each of them a piece of meat, a bowl of rice and a cup of brandy; 
fifteen oxen are hardly sufficient for these festivals, during which the savages 
perform in front of him dances and songs, as if adoring him. […] Formerly, people 
of the Kioukiang [Qiujiang] valley had each year to provide him a slave. Currently 
this habit is abolished, but, to preserve at least the form and part of the value, they 
give him in place a statue made out of wax of the size of a twelve years old child” 
(Roux, 1897: 227). 
This reference to slavery once again stresses the importance of this institution and 
the form of dependence that could be established. If a slave is due, one leaves the sphere of 
exchange to enter an asymmetrical relationship characteristic of dependence. Therefore, 
power seems above all to be a matter of economic control rather than effective political 
authority. And control was essentially asserted over ritual goods (such as slaves and oxen) 
enabling one to assert one’s rank or claim for status. 
In northwest Yunnan, as in neighboring areas, the role and value of the ox was of 
primary importance: the ox can be seen as a good that enhanced status and prestige, as did 
slaves. The sacrifice of the ox and the sharing of meat was an expression of these local 
conceptions of prestige and wealth, common amongst several societies in the Himalayan 
border areas as well as in mainland Southeast Asia and often refered to under the label of 
“Feast of Merit.”27 Moreover, the ritual slaughter of animals and the distribution of their 
flesh appear to be the principle means through which one could acquire (or confirm) power 
and status. Stevenson (1943) rightly qualified the working of these feasts as a “prestige 
                                                 
25 On that point see also Sagant, 1990: 163. 
26 Most probably Huobajie, the Chinese name for the Festival of the torches. 
27 See Bouchery, this volume about the Feasts of Merit among the Naga. These feasts could also accurately 
be refered to as “cults of fertility.” 
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economy,” for one of their main concerns was with prestige and wealth. 28  Such a 
sacrificial practice remains a cultural characteristic of the Drung people today. Even 
though they abandoned it under the political constraints of the 1950’s, the meaning and 
cultural value of the practice is still very much alive.  
 
The missing share 
One of the many myths the Drung people have in their repertoire is especially 
important for understanding some essential values shared by the members of their society. 
This myth also tells us about the logic (and/or the morality) of interpersonal relationships: 
One day, after an abundant harvest, a man called Punggrin Pung decided to 
organise a great feast (dvruq-wa) that lasted for nine days and nights. All types of 
animals on earth joined the party. Then came the day to end the feast, meat and 
alcohol where nearly finished. The little that was left, according to custom, had to 
be shared equally. The number of participants was counted, and the meat divided.29 
But, no matter how they would count, again and again, two shares were always 
missing. The two who received no meat decided to go hunting in the mountains. 
During the hunt, one of the two disappeared and became a spirit, Tsheu-pvlang, 
who demands offerings. 
This man who became a spirit requires his due. He is one of the most feared 
amongst the Drung people. He appears as an always unsatisfied figure, the prototype of the 
kind of spirits with whom the relationship is that of debt: no sharing can be done without 
him potentially coming around, as if people’s debts towards him were permanent and could 
never be paid. 
This myth is often told in order to account for the origin of this particular spirit and 
to explain the origin of the sacrificial feast that the Drung people used to perform yearly. 
The Drung name for the ritual sacrifice of an ox is called dvruq-wa, literally “group-
making.” Its very name underlines one of its essential aspects: according to the general 
                                                 
28 See for example Russell (ed.), 1989. I find myself much in accordance with Durrenberger (1989: 114) in 
the way he described the Lisu “ideology of honor”: “In highland Southeast Asia, there is an ideology of 
honor and wealth that can be translated into rank and prestige under certain circumstances. Where wealth and 
access to valued goods are scarce, hierarchic forms will develop; where they are widespread, egalitarian 
forms will develop. Both hierarchic and egalitarian forms are based on the same ideology, but the social 
forms are largely shaped by economic relationships.” 
29 The animal could differ according to different versions. 
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principle, the sacrificial victim is cut and its meat shared, the sharing network drawing the 
contours of the community.30 
Among the Drung, this kind of sacrifice was an opportunity for the one who was 
rich enough to own an ox to validate his prestige (koksang) and his wealth (karji). Drung 
people did not raise their own cattle in the past, and oxen were obtained through trade 
relations outside their valley, especially with the Tibetans who exchanged them against 
goods or, more likely, individuals who would become slaves. Oxen were representative of 
one’s wealth and such feasts were the principal means of political expression. On the one 
hand they reinforced the cohesion of the local group as well as alliance relationships, but 
on the other hand they could only enable one to affirm a provisional dominance, or 
prestige; this prestige could be challenged, as it was embedded in a permanent process of 
competition. This individualist competition is totally in opposition to hereditary status. 
Thus, for the Drung people, it was the language of sacrifice and sharing that 
prevailed at the political level. It was at the heart of the local politico-religious dynamic, 
assuring social cohesion, reaffirming power relations and kinship ties. The ritual ensured 
the maintenance of the ties that linked the sacrifice’s giver with his social horizon, his 
relatives, affines and neighbours. At the same time, the function of sacrifice was crucial for 
the internal process of competition and redistribution within Drung society.  
Similar to sacrificial practices such as “Feasts of Merit” that emphasise sharing and 
the display of wealth, these feasts could create and/or validate distinctions regarding power 
and social status by transforming material wealth into social rank. And in some cases, these 
feasts were more about recognition or legitimisation than the granting of power.31  
Nowadays, the ceremony of the ox sacrifice has disappeared among the Drung 
people. But its underlying principle still prevails in the Drung people’s ideology and 
representation of power. What is still alive is the idea that any pretension to authority 
should be validated through generosity.  
                                                 
30 It is interesting to contrast the drung expression, “group making” (dvruq-wa) and the kachin one “nat 
making” (nat galaw). Nevertheless, Leach (1979 [1954]) description of the Kachin nat galaw could be 
extended to the drung context: “Thus from a certain point of view a Kachin religious sacrifice may be 
regarded as a purely technical and economic act. It is a procedure for killing livestock and distributing the 
meat, and I think there can be little doubt that for most Kachins this seems the most important aspect of the 
matter. A nat galaw (‘nat making’, a sacrifice) is almost a synonym for a good feast. But from the observer’s 
point of view there is a great deal that goes on at a sacrifice that is quite irrelevant as far as butchery, cooking 
and meat distribution are concerned. It is these other aspects which have meaning as symbols of social status, 
and it is these other aspects which I describe as ritual…” (p. 13; see also p. 172, 174).  
31  One could refer for example (among many others) to Fürer-Haimendorf (1967); Lehman (1989); 
Woodward (1989); Jacobs (1991: Chap. 8); Kammerer and Tannenbaum (1996). 
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This allows us to understand some aspects of the present day relationship of the 
Drung to the Chinese state (see Gros, 2005). Constant subsidies and assistance from the 
communist state, perceived as a welfare state, are an integral part of the validity of its 
power and authority. Without what can be seen as a constant dispensing of wealth, the state 
would lose its legitimacy and prestige—a prestige that it had gained, especially for the last 
generation, through constant assistance and help. This state, seen as a “provider of goods,” 
appears through the lens of the Drung’s vision as only a historical manifestation of a type 
of political power that depends on a principle of redistribution. 
Obviously, some fundamental principles of social relationships pertain even if the 
structure of which they were a part are being altered or destroyed. The “prestige economy” 
does not play a central political role anymore; it is relegated to the margins. 
In the Drung valley, attempts to effect conversion to Christianity have been 
relatively successful. “Religion” - Christianity - is being valorised in opposition to 
“Superstition” - popular religion. Christians gather regularly for the holydays of the 
Christian calendar, and at these gatherings, pigs or other animals are slaughtered and their 
meat is shared among all participants. According to the Drung themselves, it is the same as 
“making the group” (dvruq-wa). These Christian feasts, and the community they contribute 
to creating are a contextual answer to the present economic, political and cultural situation. 
From that perspective, Christianity could constitute a new horizon. Conversion could be a 
way to go back to the time of sacrifice, to a social cohesion in which a new “being 
together” becomes possible.32 
Macdonald (1980) has pointed out the importance of the conceptual model of 
“creative dismemberment” among some Himalayan societies and argues that the model 
could directly be used and exploited by political and economic elites as an instrument of 
social control. In the context of political centralisation, the sacrifice gives way to relations 
of domination, as we have seen. One can also argue that, through the sacrifice, it is rather 
previous conditions that are confirmed and re-established: the ties of reciprocal obligations, 
the stratified status in a social hierarchy, etc. According to Oppitz (1997), the creativity lies 
in myth, whereas in reality, sacrificial practices can only re-create. But it could also be 
argued that through meat division, something else comes into existence, and is, therefore, 
created. 
                                                 
32 The problem of religious conversion among the Drung is the topic of a work in progress. 
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For the Drung, the logic of sacrifice was central politically; it was a means by 
which the contours of the society could be redrawn, a means of making and un-making the 
group. The mythical model is that of “the missing share.” That is to say, to paraphrase the 
myth, that the heart of the matter is a debt relationship. Humans have a debt toward the 
spirit that each sacrifice can only temporarily appease. But among humans themselves, the 
feast giver’s generosity and the subsequent sharing of the meat, under the appearance of 
the gift, hides the debt. 
We have seen that debt relationships have played an important role in the 
constitution of local spheres of power in the larger region of northwest Yunnan. These 
relationships were formalised by ritual means and ritual came to assert the participants’ 
respective positions. In this case, it seems to me that ritual communication is not just an 
alternative way of expressing something. It is also the expression of things that cannot be 
expressed in any other way, and maybe, as Gellner (1999: 139) argued, “it is precisely 
because rituals do not simply say things that they acquire their power to persuade and 
legitimate.” 
 
Conclusion 
Because of his broad conception of ritual as communication extended to many 
aspects of social life, the notion of ritual language used by Leach seems rather fuzzy. As 
such, the notion of ritual language can prove helpful in dealing with aspects of identity and 
political and religious relations in a multi-ethnic area, be it the Kachin Hills or elsewhere, 
such as in northwest Yunnan. Yet, despite its heuristic value, which enables one to point 
out similarities between otherwise dissimilar groups, it needs further elaboration.  
I have tried to show that for the Drung, meat division, and more generally 
sacrificial feasting that involves the distribution of the flesh of the sacrificed animal, 
appears to be a model of internal and external power distribution.33 But it is also, more 
generally speaking, a model for inclusion and distinction. In other words, there is a double 
movement: at the same time as it creates or confirms social relationships, it also sets people 
apart by classifying and attributing social positions. In the case of the Drung, I see debt as 
a prototypical form of relationship that prevails in both relations between individuals and 
groups, and between people and supernatural entities. It is this ideology that expresses 
itself through ritual actions such as meat division. Or to put it another way, the notion of 
                                                 
33 This point was already made clear in a comparative perspective in Russell (ed.), 1989. 
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debt is the principle of efficiency that structures the world view and gives ritual 
performances their meaning at the same time. I am tempted to propose that the notion of 
debt could aptly characterize some essential aspect of the common structure on which this 
ritual language of sharing is articulated. I would argue that Leach’s notion of ritual 
language can be reformulated by placing the notion of debt as a central element of what 
this “language” tells us of the underlying order.  
In this specific case, the ideology that the ritual language expresses is in a broad 
sense an ideology of “power,” but authority and control only appear with control over the 
source of wealth, which includes ritual goods (oxen) and land. This ideology involves 
interrelated concepts of wealth and power that are central in the dynamic of social 
relations. This dynamic itself is supported by the logic of the debt that we find in 
relationships between people, and between people and the other world. To paraphrase 
Leach then, I would say that a common ritual language exists insofar as what it expresses 
through symbolical performances is a general ideology of power that reflects not simply 
social relations, but relations of indebtedness. And this formulation, I believe, find its roots 
in Leach’s work itself, partly in Political Systems and clearly in his concise Social 
Anthropology (1982). 
The practices surrounding debt relationships were analysed in detail by Leach when 
he dealt with the categories of hka (debt) and hpaga (trade, ritual wealth object). As Leach 
formulated it, almost any kind of legal obligation existing between two Kachins is likely to 
be described as a debt, and debts are expressed in terms of hpaga (for a discussion, see Ho 
this volume). He also underlined the important aspect that “the debt is a kind of credit 
account which ensures the continuity of the relationship. There is thus a kind of paradox 
that the existence of a debt may signify not only a state of hostility but also a state of 
dependence and friendship” (1982: 153). 
From Mauss to Lévi-Strauss, following a social approach to exchange, there is 
more in the exchange than just what is exchanged. What is “more” is the social relationship 
established in the process. In The Gift, Mauss insists on the imperativeness of the 
obligation to reciprocate, and even states that “the punishment for failure to reciprocate is 
slavery for debt” (1990: 42). It seems that Leach’s position was very much inspired by 
Mauss with the nuance that the network of social relationships that one can observe 
through gift-exchange behaviour is a network of indebtedness. He makes this point clearly 
in Social Anthropology by writing: “persisting relationships only exist as feelings of 
indebtedness. From time to time every such persisting debt relationship needs to be made 
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manifest in an actual gift transaction, but the relationship is in the feeling of indebtedness 
not in the gift” (1982: 154). In other words, the mechanism of gift-exchange is that of 
debt.34 
Though not stated very explicitly, Leach’s concern in Political Systems was very 
much the notion of power, but in the limited sense of the “attribute of ‘office holders’, that 
is of social persons who occupy positions to which power attaches” (1997 [1954]: 10). But 
if power is a result of participation in interpersonal relationships, both the political and 
economic aspects are embedded in a global system. Leach’s analysis in terms of the logic 
of linguistics applied to ritual can be extended to this global system, and, in his own words: 
“the fields of kinship, economy, politics, law, religion etc., are all versions of the same 
thing. Each mode of expression of a particular relationship is metaphoric of all other” 
(1982: 158). In forging the notion of ritual language, it seems to me that Leach was 
formulating his version of Mauss’s “total social fact.” Both notions refer to the totality of 
society and its institutions, and to the mechanism by which individual interests combine to 
make a social system. In a way, Leach’s conclusion of his Social Anthropology could, 
retrospectively, be used fruitfully as an entry point for understanding some important 
arguments in his Political Systems: “The thesis that runs through this book is that it is only 
when we come to understand that relationships between man and man and man and god 
are, at least in a metaphorical sense, the equivalent of economic indebtedness, that we can 
really appreciate how this transformation of economics into ideology through the 
mediation of kinship actually occurs. So it is really Chapter 5 [Debt, Relationship, Power], 
which elaborates a sociological theory of debt, which provides the keystone to my 
argument” (1982: 223). And it is very much the same argument that lies behind his 
treatment of his Kachin ethnography and his use of the notion of ritual language. 
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